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Abstract
We study trade policy in a two-sector Krugman-type trade model with home market
effects. We allow for three different instruments: tariffs, export taxes and production
subsidies. For each instrument, we consider unilateral trade policy without retaliation.
We find – contrary to the results of previous studies – that production subsidies are
always inefficiently low and driven by the incentives to improve the (welfare relevant)
terms of trade. For tariffs and export taxes we show that results depend crucially on
the (in)efficiency of the free trade allocation. When starting from an allocation that is
distorted because of monopolistic competition, the home market effect (and in the case
of export taxes also the desire to correct for the monopolistic inefficiency) induces policy
makers to set a tariff (an export subsidy). However, when monopolistic distortions are
corrected, terms of trade effects dominate the choice of trade policy and lead to an import
subsidy (an export tax).
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study trade policy in a version of the Krugman (1980) model of intra-
industry trade with monopolistic competition and increasing returns. We consider a two country
version of the Krugman model with two sectors: one with monopolistic competition, increasing
returns and iceberg trade costs and one that features perfect competition and constant returns.
Within this framework, we study the unilateral incentives to set production subsidies/taxes,
import subsidies/tariffs, as well as export taxes/subsidies.1
In our analysis, we disentangle three different effects that drive policy makers’ incentives to
set trade policy unilaterally and which they have to trade off against each other. First, a
standard terms of trade externality – the desire to manipulate international prices in favor of
the domestic economy by decreasing the relative price of imported bundles. Second, a home
market (production relocation) externality. This externality leads policy makers to induce firms
to locate in the domestic economy, so that domestic consumers can save on transport costs and
benefit from a lower price level. Third, a misallocation between the differentiated and the
homogeneous sector due to monopolistic pricing that implies a too low number of firms in the
differentiated sector.2
When a production subsidy/tax is the only instrument available, single country policy makers
subsidize domestic output, but never up to the level that would implement the Pareto-optimal
allocation. The reason is that the terms of trade externality always dominates the other effects.
Lower subsidies imply lower relative prices of importables in world markets, whereas the home
market effect would call for over-subsidizing production in order to attract firms to the domestic
economy.
In the cases of import tariffs and export taxes, the novelty of our analysis is to show that
optimal unilateral policy choices depend crucially on whether the initial allocation is efficient.
There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, when the initial allocation is inefficient, the
volume of trade is low because there are too few firms in the differentiated sector.3 Consequently,
1For cooperative and strategic determination of trade policy see Campolmi, Fadinger and Forlati (2010).
2The inefficiency arises because there are two sectors in the model – a perfectly competitive one and one with
monopolistic competition. In their seminal paper, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) showed that the market solution is
not first best Pareto optimal in their model and that subsidies on fixed costs and on marginal costs are required
to implement it. More recently, Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007) find a similar distortion in a closed economy
model with endogenous variety once they introduce endogenous labor supply (a second sector).
3In a symmetric equilibrium all trade is intra-industry.
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the terms of trade externality is less relevant than in the case of efficiency. On the other hand,
the price level is higher because less varieties are available, therefore the incentive to decrease
it is stronger. Thus, the home market effect is more important than when the allocation is
Pareto-optimal.
Specifically, when starting from an inefficient allocation – the case considered in the previous
literature – single countries’ policy makers subsidize domestic production using import tariffs
or export subsidies. They do this in order to save on transport costs (home market effect) and,
in the case of export subsidies, also to correct for the monopolistic distortion. In contrast, if the
inefficiency of the initial allocation is eliminated with production subsidies, the terms of trade
externality dominates. Thus, policymakers find it optimal to reduce the number of domestic
varieties using an import subsidy or an export tax.
Finally, if we allow for an elasticity of substitution between varieties that is larger than the
trade elasticity, import subsidies (export taxes) are optimal for most of the relevant parameter
space, even when not correcting the monopolistic distortions.
Our results differ from those of the previous literature that has analyzed trade policy in a two-
sector Krugman model. There are several reasons for this. First, we consider income effects of
trade and production taxes, while previous contributions have either assumed that tariffs are a
pure waste (Venables (1987), Ossa (2008)) or that utility is quasi-linear (Helpman and Krugman
(1989) Bagwell and Staiger (2009)). While these assumptions guarantee analytical tractability,
both eliminate important general equilibrium effects. Second, we use an alternative definition
of the terms of trade, which turns out to be extremely useful if one wants to understand optimal
trade policy choices. While the previous literature has considered relative prices of individual
varieties in world markets as the terms of trade, we define the welfare relevant terms of trade as
the relative optimal price index of imported goods.4 This definition highlights that also policy
instruments, which do not have a direct impact on world market prices of individual varieties
(e.g. tariffs), have terms of trade effects.5 This is because all policy instruments affect the
number of domestic and foreign differentiated varieties and therefore the welfare relevant price
indices. Third, we are the first to underline the role played by the inefficiency of the initial
4This welfare based definition of the terms of trade is common in the international macroeconomics literature.
See for example Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Epifani and Gancia (2009).
5This statement holds true with constant returns in the homogeneous sector (which implies factor price
equalization).
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allocation on trade policy. This allows to interpret existing results in a new light.
For example, Venables (1987) interprets the result that a small production subsidy or an export
subsidy increases welfare in the light of a home market effect, while we show that the subsidy
is always smaller than the one that implements the Pareto-optimal allocation. This implies
that domestic policy makers try to improve their terms of trade rather than to increase the
number of domestic firms above the efficient level. Still, they choose a positive level of subsidy
because the number of firms in the decentralized equilibrium without policy intervention is too
low.6 Turning to his results on tariffs, which has recently been confirmed by Ossa (2008) in a
strategic setting, he finds that a country’s welfare is always raised by a unilateral increase in its
import tariffs because of the home market effect. However, we show that this result does not
go through and that the terms of trade effect dominates when the initial allocation is efficient.7
Finally, Bagwell and Staiger (2009) consider a variant of the two-sector Krugman model with
quasi-linear utility and allow policy makers to simultaneously choose tariffs and export taxes
in a strategic setting. They show that in this special case Nash-equilibrium policy choices
are explained exclusively by the desire to manipulate international prices and not by the home
market externality. Strategic interaction in our more general framework is studied in Campolmi
et al. (2010).
Summarizing, the main contributions of our paper are the following ones. We isolate the differ-
ent incentives that determine policy makers’ objectives and show how they interact. Moreover,
we show that home market effects never determine trade policy in the case of production sub-
sidies/taxes and that when considering tariffs and export taxes as the trade policy instrument
results depend crucially on the (in)efficiency of the initial allocation. We also clarify what the
welfare relevant terms of trade are in this model and make clear that both home market and
terms of trade effects coexist even when we consider a linear outside good and tariffs as the
only policy instrument.
6Romer (1994) emphasizes that the effect of trade policy on the number of differentiated varieties in the
economy has large welfare effects that dominate other effects of trade policy (such as terms of trade effects).
Here, we show that this statement is correct as long as the number of varieties is inefficiently low.
7As shown by Gros (1987), this would not be the case in a one-sector economy where it is always optimal to
set an import tariff due to terms of trade effects. In the one-sector model, the number of varieties is fixed and
the competitive equilibrium (with or without trade) is Pareto-optimal. Hence, neither monopolistic distortions
nor the home market effect play any role for policy makers’ incentives. At the same time, without the linear
outside good, trade policy has an effect on factor prices and affects the terms of trade. Thus, our results are
consistent with his.
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The paper proceeds as follows: The next section sets up the model and Section 3 presents the
equilibrium conditions. In the following sections we discuss the definition of the terms of trade
and the different incentives that determine policy makers’ choices. Section 6 is dedicated to
studying trade policy, while Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The world economy consists of two countries: Home and Foreign. Each country produces
a homogenous good and a continuum of differentiated goods. All goods are tradable but
only the differentiated goods are subject to transport costs. The differentiated goods sector is
characterized by monopolistic competition while there is perfect competition in the homogenous
good sector. Both countries are identical in terms of preferences, production technology and
market structure. In what follows Foreign variables will be denoted by a (*).
2.1 Households
Household’s utility function in the Home country is given by:
U(C,Z) ≡ CαZ1−α (1)
where C aggregates over the varieties of differentiated goods, Z represents the homogeneous
good and α is the expenditure share of the differentiated bundle in the aggregate consumption
basket. While the homogeneous good is identical across countries, each country produces a
different subset of differentiated goods. In particular, N varieties are produced in the Home
country while N∗ are produced by Foreign. We allow for a general specification of the consump-
tion aggregators with two different elasticity of substitutions, one between Home and Foreign
goods (η) and one between goods produced in the same country (ε):8
C =
[
C
η−1
η
H + C
η−1
η
F
] η
η−1
η > 0 (2)
8Note that when η = ε, C =
[∫ N
0
c(h)
ε−1
ε dh+
∫ N∗
0
c(f)
ε−1
ε df
] ε
ε−1
i.e. the model collapses to the standard
one considered in this literature. All our main results on trade policy are derived under the assumption η = ε.
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CH =
[∫ N
0
c(h)
ε−1
ε dh
] ε
ε−1
CF =
[∫ N∗
0
c(f)
ε−1
ε df
] ε
ε−1
ε > 1 (3)
Foreign consumers have an analogous utility function. Let p(h) (p∗(h)) be the price paid
by Home (Foreign) consumers for domestically produced varieties while p(f) (p∗(f)) is the
price paid by home (foreign) consumers for imported varieties. In general, p(h) 6= p∗(f) and
p∗(h) 6= p(f) because of transport costs, taxes on production, on imports and on exports.
Households inelastically supply L units of labor. The budget constraint of Home consumers
reads as follows:
PC + pZZ = WL+ T, (4)
where W is the wage, pZ is the price of the homogeneous good, P is the price of the differentiated
bundle and T is a lump sum tax/transfer which depends on the tariff/subsidy scheme adopted
by the domestic government and which will be defined later. The solution to the consumer
problem gives the following demand functions and price indices:
• Home’s and Foreign’s demand for differentiated varieties produced by Home:
c(h) =
[
p(h)
PH
]−ε
CH c
∗(f) =
[
p∗(f)
P ∗F
]−ε
C∗F (5)
CH =
[
PH
P
]−η
C C∗F =
[
P ∗F
P ∗
]−η
C∗ (6)
• Home’s and Foreign’s demand for differentiated varieties produced by Foreign:
c(f) =
[
p(f)
PF
]−ε
CF c
∗(h) =
[
p∗(h)
P ∗H
]−ε
C∗H (7)
CF =
[
PF
P
]−η
C C∗H =
[
P ∗H
P ∗
]−η
C∗ (8)
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• Demand for the homogeneous good in Home and Foreign:
Z =
1− α
α
P
pZ
C Z∗ =
1− α
α
P ∗
p∗Z
C∗ (9)
• Domestic price indices:
P =
[
P 1−ηH + P
1−η
F
] 1
1−η (10)
PH =
[∫ N
0
p(h)1−εdh
] 1
1−ε
PF =
[∫ N∗
0
p(f)1−εdf
] 1
1−ε
(11)
• Foreign price indices:
P ∗ =
[
P ∗H
1−η + P ∗F
1−η] 11−η (12)
P ∗H =
[∫ N∗
0
p∗(h)1−εdh
] 1
1−ε
P ∗F =
[∫ N
0
p∗(f)1−εdf
] 1
1−ε
(13)
2.2 Firms in the Differentiated Sector
Firms in the differentiated sector operate in a regime of monopolistic competition. They pay a
fixed cost in terms of labor f and then produce with a constant returns to scale technology:
y(h) = LC(h)− f, (14)
where LC(h) is the amount of labor allocated to the production of the differentiated good h.
Goods sold in the foreign market are subject to an iceberg transport cost τ ≥ 1. Governments
in both countries can use three policy instruments: a production tax/subsidy on fixed and
marginal costs (τC), a tariff/subsidy on imports (τI) and a tax/subdsidy on exports (τX).
9 A
(*) indicates the Foreign policy instruments. We assume that subsidies (taxes) are received
(paid) directly by the firms. Equivalently, we could have consumers receiving (paying) them
from (to) the government.
Given the constant price elasticity of demand, optimal prices charged by Home firms in the
9In general τi indicates the gross subsidy/tax for i ∈ {C, I,X} i.e., τi < 1 indicates a subsidy, τi > 1 indicates
a tax while when τi = 1 the policy instrument is not used.
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domestic market are a fixed markup over their perceived marginal cost τCW and optimal prices
paid by Foreign consumers equal domestic prices augmented by transport costs and tariffs:10
p(h) = τC
ε
ε− 1W p
∗(f) = τ ∗I τXτp(h) (15)
In the same way, Foreign firms’ optimal pricing decisions lead to:
p∗(h) = τ ∗C
ε
ε− 1W
∗ p(f) = τIτ ∗Xτp
∗(h) (16)
2.3 Homogeneous good sector
Both countries can produce a homogenous good using the same production technology:
QZ = LZ (17)
where LZ is the amount of labor allocated to producing the homogeneous good. The good
is sold in a perfectly competitive market without trade costs. Consequently, the price equals
marginal cost and is the same in both countries:
pZ = W pZ = p
∗
Z (18)
Due to the assumption of constant returns to scale, and as long as the homogeneous good is
produced in both countries in equilibrium, which we will assume for the rest of the paper, there
is factor price equalization:
pZ = p
∗
Z = W = W
∗ (19)
2.4 Government
The government of each country disposes of three fiscal instruments. A production tax/subsidy
(τC), a tariff/subsidy on imports (τI) and a tax/subsidy on exports (τX). All government
revenues are redistributed to consumers through a lump sum transfer T . The government is
10Following the previous literature (Venables (1987), Ossa (2008)), we assume that tariffs and export taxes
are charged ad valorem on the factory gate price augmented by transport costs. This implies that transport
services are taxed.
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assumed to run a balanced budget. Hence, the government’s budget constraint is:
(τI − 1)τ ∗XτP ∗HCF + (τX − 1)τPHC∗F + (τC − 1)W
∫ N
0
(y(h) + f)dh = T (20)
Total government income consists of import revenues charged on imports of differentiated
goods gross of transport costs and foreign export taxes; export taxes charged on exports gross
of transport costs; and the production tax revenues.
3 Equilibrium
Given that firms share the same production technology, the equilibrium is symmetric – all
firms in the differentiated sector of a given country charge the same price and produce the
same quantity. This implies that in equilibrium price indices can be written as:
p(h)
PH
= N
1
ε−1
p∗(h)
P ∗H
= N∗
1
ε−1 (21)
PF = τIτ
∗
XτP
∗
H P
∗
F = τ
∗
I τXτPH (22)
3.1 Free Entry in the Differentiated Sector
The assumption of free entry in the differentiated sector implies that monopolistic producers
make zero profits in equilibrium:11
Π(h) = c(h) [p(h)− τCW ] + c∗(f) [τp(h)− ττCW ]− fτCW = 0 (23)
Combining the optimal pricing rule with equation (23), we obtain:
c(h) + τc∗(f) = (ε− 1)f (24)
Substituting the demand functions into (24) and using (21) and (22), the zero profit condition
11Remember that firms pay (receive) taxes (subsidies) to (from) the government. Taking this into account,
firms’ revenues from exporting are given by c∗(f)p
∗(f)
τ∗I τX
= c∗(f)τp(h).
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for firms in the domestic differentiated sector can be rewritten as:
(ε− 1)f = N ε1−ε
(
PH
pz
)−η [(
P
pz
)η
C + τ 1−η(τ ∗I τX)
−η
(
P ∗
pz
)η
C∗
]
(25)
An analogous condition can be derived for firms located in Foreign:
(ε− 1)f = N∗ ε1−ε
(
P ∗H
pz
)−η [(
P ∗
pz
)η
C∗ + τI−ητ ∗X
−ητ 1−η
(
P
pz
)η
C
]
(26)
3.2 Goods and Labor Market Clearing Conditions
For each differentiated variety produced by Home the following market clearing condition must
be satisfied:
y(h) = c(h) + τc∗(f) (27)
Therefore, the zero profit condition (24) and market clearing (27) imply that the production of
each variety is fixed and the same is true for the varieties produced by Foreign:
y(h) = (ε− 1)f y∗(h) = (ε− 1)f (28)
The market clearing condition for the homogeneous good is given by:
QZ +Q
∗
Z = Z + Z
∗, (29)
which, using the demand functions, can be written as:
QZ +Q
∗
Z =
(1− α)
α
[
P
pz
C +
P ∗
pz
C∗
]
(30)
Finally, equilibrium in the labor market implies that L = LC + LZ with LC = NLC(h) in the
symmetric equilibrium. Making use of (14) and (28), we have:
LC = Nεf QZ = L−Nεf (31)
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and for Foreign:
L∗C = N
∗εf Q∗Z = L
∗ −N∗εf (32)
3.3 Balanced Trade Condition
The model is solved under the assumption of financial autarky, so trade is balanced. Net-exports
of the homogenous good by Home are defined as:
ZX − ZM ≡ QZ − 1− α
α
P
pZ
C (33)
Hence, the balanced trade condition reads as follows:12
ττXPHC
∗
F + pZ
(
ZX − ZM) = ττ ∗XP ∗HCF (34)
The left hand side of the above expression is the sum of net export value of the homogeneous
goods and the value of exports of differentiated varieties, while the right hand side is the value
of imports of differentiated varieties.
Combining (33) with (22), (34) and the demand functions, we can rewrite the balanced trade
condition as follows:
QZ =
(1− α)
α
P
pz
C + τ−ηI (τ
∗
Xτ)
1−η
(
P ∗H
pz
)1−η (
P
pz
)η
C − τ ∗I −η(τXτ)1−η
(
PH
pz
)1−η (
P ∗
pz
)η
C∗
(35)
3.4 Price Indices
Using the optimal pricing rules (15) and (18) together with equations (17) and (21) (and the
corresponding ones for Foreign), relative prices can be written as follows:
PH
pz
=
ε
ε− 1τCN
1
1−ε
P ∗H
pz
=
ε
ε− 1τ
∗
CN
∗ 11−ε (36)
12Import tariffs/subsidies are collected directly by the governments at the border so they do not enter into
this condition.
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Ppz
=
[(
PH
pz
)1−η
+ (τIτ
∗
Xτ)
1−η
(
P ∗H
pz
)1−η] 11−η
P ∗
pz
=
[(
P ∗H
pz
)1−η
+ (τ ∗I τXτ)
1−η
(
PH
pz
)1−η] 11−η
(37)
The free entry conditions for the two countries (25) and (26), the market clearing condition for
the homogeneous good (30) and the balanced trade condition (35) together with the expressions
for price indices just derived and (31) and (32) fully characterize the equilibrium of the economy.
For the case η = ε it is possible to solve the system explicitly for N and N∗. The expressions
for these variables can be found in the Appendix.
Before going into the details of trade policy choice under different instruments, in the next
two sections we clarify two main points. First, the relevant definition of the terms of trade.
Second, the different economic incentives that determine unilateral trade policies.
4 The Welfare Relevant Terms of Trade
One crucial aspect of our study of policy makers’ incentives to set trade policy is to define
the terms of trade in the way that is relevant for policy makers. All previous contributions
in this literature (Venables (1987), Helpman and Krugman (1989), Ossa (2008), Bagwell and
Staiger (2009)) have defined the terms of trade as the relative prices of individual varieties
in international markets,
ττ∗Xp
∗(h)
ττXp(h)
=
τ∗Xτ
∗
C
τXτC
. Because of the assumption of a linear outside good,
relative wages are one. Consequently, only export and production taxes can affect these relative
prices.
However, these are not the relative prices in international markets that are welfare relevant.
Domestic consumers – and thus domestic policy makers – are interested in how many units of
foreign bundles they can buy for a given amount of domestic bundles. This relation is reflected
in the trade balance condition (34).
Dividing (34) by (ττXPH) we obtain C
∗
F +
(
pz
ττXPH
)
(ZX − ZM) =
(
τ∗XP
∗
H
τXPH
)
CF , where the left
hand side is the value of domestic exports and the right hand side is the value of domestic
imports. In this relation all variables are written in terms of optimal consumption indices.13
Consider the case in which Home imports the homogeneous good (ZX = 0). In this case an
13The consumption indices are the Hicksian demand functions for the respective bundles, which minimize
expenditure for a given utility level.
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increase in the relative world market price (before tariffs are applied) of the Foreign differen-
tiated bundle in terms of the domestic bundle
(
τ∗XP
∗
H
τXPH
)
hurts domestic consumers because the
amount of Foreign differentiated goods they can buy for a given amount of domestic goods
decreases. Similarly, an increase of the relative price of homogeneous goods in international
markets pz/(ττXPH) in terms of domestic exports also lowers the purchasing power of domestic
exports in terms of Foreign goods.
As a consequence, the two relative world market prices that are of interest for domestic policy
makers – and thus the welfare relevant definition of the terms of trade – are (τ ∗XP
∗
H)/(τXPH)
and pz/(ττXPH) if Home is an importer of the homogeneous good.
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Using the definition of the price indices, we can write the welfare-relevant terms of trade as(
τ∗XP
∗
H
τXPH
)
=
(
N
N∗
) 1
ε−1 τ
∗
Xτ
∗
C
τXτC
. Hence, the relative international price of imports of differentiated
goods in terms of exports depends positively on the relative number of varieties produced
domestically. It also depends directly on domestic and Foreign production subsidies τC , τ
∗
C and
export taxes τX , τ
∗
X . Note that the previous literature has only considered the second part
of the above expression as the terms of trade, omitting the part that depends on the relative
number of domestic varieties,
(
N
N∗
) 1
ε−1 . Intuitively, an increase in N∗ for a given N increases
the utility derived from a given expenditure on the Foreign bundle.
It becomes clear that with the definition of the terms of trade we propose here, all policy
instruments (production subsidies, tariffs and export taxes) affect the terms of trade indirectly,
by changing the distribution of firms located in the domestic and in the Foreign economy.
5 Single Country Policy Makers’ Incentives
In this section we clarify the role played by different inefficiencies/externalities in affecting a
country’s decision over its trade policy.
For the case commonly studied in the literature η = ε, it is possible to derive closed form
solutions for the equilibrium allocations and prices. In that case we can use the representative
consumer’s indirect utility function to disentangle the different effects that determine unilateral
trade policy choices. In the rest of this section and whenever we want to provide analytical
results, we will restrict preferences to this special case.
14If Home is an exporter of the homogeneous good, (ττ∗XP
∗
H)/pz is the second relevant relative price.
13
Up to a constant, indirect utility in logs can be written as15
log (V (P/pz, I)) = −α log
(
P
pz
)
+ log
(
I
pz
)
(38)
The first term, which can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the real wage, is decreasing
in the relative price of the differentiated bundle. The second term is income in terms of the
homogeneous good (labor). Differentiating indirect utility with respect to the dummy trade
policy instrument τi, we obtain
∂ log(V (P/pz, I))
∂τi
= −α
∂(P/pz)
∂τi
P/pz
+
∂(I/pz)
∂τi
I/pz
. (39)
Thus, trade policy affects indirect utility through two channels. On the one hand, it impacts
on indirect utility through its effect on the relative price of the differentiated good. Since P
pz
can be written as ε
ε−1 [N+N
∗]
1
1−ε [sτ 1−εc +(τ
∗
CτIτ
∗
Xτ)
1−ε(1−s)] 11−ε , where s = N
N+N∗ , trade policy
affects relative prices both directly and indirectly (through changes in s and in (N +N∗)). On
the other hand, indirect utility changes through trade policy’s impact on domestic income.
Note that income can be expressed from the trade balance.16 Using the definition of consump-
tion indices, and substituting the labor market clearing condition, the trade balance condition
can be rewritten as:
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−ε ( pz
P ∗
)
α
I∗
pz
+
(
pz
ττXPH
)(
L− εfN − (1− α) I
pz
)
=
(
τ ∗XP
∗
H
τXPH
)(
PF
P
)−ε (pz
P
)
α
I
pz
(40)
Totally differentiating this equation with respect to the policy instrument and collecting terms,
we obtain:
∂
(
I
pz
)
∂τi
= B−1(B1 +B2 +B3 +B4 +B5), (41)
where B1 ≡
[(
L− εfN − (1− α) I
pz
)
∂
“
pz
ττXPH
”
∂τi
− α (PF
P
)−ε (pz
P
)
I
pz
∂
„
τ∗XP
∗
H
τXPH
«
∂τi
]
15See appendix for derivations.
16Alternatively, income in terms of the homogeneous good can also be expressed as L + T/pz. However,
starting from the trade balance makes it easier to identify the different economic channels.
14
B2 ≡
[
−εf
(
pz
ττXPH
)
∂N
∂τi
]
B3 ≡
[
−εα
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−ε−1 (
pz
P ∗
)
I∗
pz
∂
„
P∗F
P∗
«
∂τi
+ α
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−ε
I∗
pz
∂( pzP∗ )
∂τi
]
B4 ≡
[
α
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−ε (
pz
P ∗
) ∂( I∗pz )
∂τi
]
B5 ≡
[
εα
(
τ∗XP
∗
H
τXPH
) (
PF
P
)−ε−1 (pz
P
)
I
pz
∂
“
PF
P
”
∂τi
− α
(
τ∗XP
∗
H
τXPH
) (
PF
P
)−ε I
pz
∂( pzP )
∂τi
]
B ≡
[
α
(
τ∗XP
∗
H
τXPH
) (
PF
P
)−ε (pz
P
)
+ (1− α)
(
pz
ττXPH
)]
We are now ready to discuss the different channels that determine unilateral trade policy.
First, with positive transport costs, there is a home market (production relocation) external-
ity. Domestic policy makers try to induce firms to relocate to the domestic economy, so that
domestic consumers can benefit from lower prices, since they save on transport costs. In terms
of indirect utility, this effect works through a decrease in P/pz by changing the relative weights
of domestic and Foreign varieties, s and (1− s).
Second, there is a terms of trade externality. Countries have market power both in import
and in export markets – they face an upward sloping export supply and a downward sloping
import demand curve. Hence, single country policy makers try to render the relative prices
of imported bundles cheaper in order to maximize the total purchasing power of domestically
produced goods in international markets. In this way they can increase domestic income by
importing more for each unit of exports.
In fact, the terms of trade externality is an income effect.17 Condition (41) clarifies exactly
this. In this expression B1 is the impact of the policy instrument on the domestic terms of trade
for given quantities of imports. If the domestic country is an importer of the homogeneous good
the first term is negative. Hence, if the change in the policy instrument reduces the relative
import price of homogeneous goods – for example by reducing the number of domestic varieties
– this affects domestic income positively. The second term is the relative price of imports of
the differentiated bundle in terms of exports of the differentiated bundle. A reduction in this
price also increases domestic income. It is clear that there is an inherent trade-off between the
terms of trade effect and the home market externality, since the first implies a reduction in the
number of domestically produced varieties while the second one calls for an increase.18
17This is well known. See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), Chapter 1.
18As explained below, B2 is the opportunity cost in terms of production of the homogeneous good of a change
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Third, there is an efficiency effect of trade policy. Without trade policy intervention, the
number of differentiated varieties at the world level, N +N∗ is too low relative to the amount
of production of the homogeneous good. This is due to monopolistic price setting in the
differentiated sector. In particular, if not corrected by the production subsidy, the price markup
charged by firms in the differentiated sector leads to an equilibrium with an inefficiently low
number of varieties and an inefficiently high level of production of the homogeneous good
because the marginal rate of substitution between the two sectors does not equal the marginal
rate of transformation. In order to correct for such an inefficiency, policy makers have an
incentive to subsidize production. By doing so, they can either completely (production subsidy)
or partially (import or export subsidy) eliminate the price markup in the differentiated sector,
thus increasing the world number of varieties, N + N∗. This monopolistic distortion incentive
enters P/pZ where it induces policy makers to increase N + N
∗. Hence, it is easy to confuse
the desire to correct the inefficiency due to monopolistic competition with the home market
effect. In addition, both the home market effect and the efficiency effect enter I/pz through the
term B2 that reflects the opportunity cost in terms of production of the homogeneous good of
increasing N .
6 Trade Policy
We now study optimal trade policy without retaliation for production taxes (τC , τ
∗
C), import
tariffs (τI , τ
∗
I ) and export taxes (τX , τ
∗
X). In each case, we analyze only the choice of one
instrument at a time, so we do not allow, for example, policy makers to set simultaneously
import tariffs and export taxes.19 A detailed analysis of coordinated trade policy and strategic
trade policy interaction for each instrument is provided in Campolmi et al. (2010).20
In order to better understand the results for the different policy instruments, it is useful to
in domestic production of differentiated varieties that is caused by a change in trade policy . The terms B3 and
B4 measure Foreign substitution and income effects induced by changes in domestic trade policy. Other things
equal, an increase in Foreign demand for domestic goods due to a fall in their relative price or due to higher
Foreign income, augments domestic income. This is because it allows Home to import more Foreign goods.
Similarly, B5 is the domestic substitution effect.
19Hence, when policy makers choose import tariffs, τX and τ∗X are always set equal to one. This is an
important difference with respect to the analysis in Bagwell and Staiger (2009).
20In that paper we investigate optimal trade policies both from the perspective of single country policy makers,
studying the Nash equilibrium of the game, and from the perspective of a cooperative authority that maximizes
average welfare of the world economy.
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consider the efficient allocation as a benchmark. While we refer to Campolmi et al. (2010) for the
formal derivations, here it is enough to summarize the main result. The first best allocation can
be reached by setting the production subsidy in each country at the level required to eliminate
the price markup in the differentiated sector (τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
, τI = τ
∗
I = τX = τ
∗
X = 1).
For each of the policy instruments we then investigate two cases. Under the first hypothesis,
the monopolistic distortion in the differentiated sector is not corrected (i.e. τC = τ
∗
C = 1),
while under the second one it is offset by an appropriate production subsidy (i.e. τC = τ
∗
C =
(ε− 1)/ε). These two scenarios allow to disentangle the consequences of the inefficiency caused
by monopolistic pricing in the differentiated sector from the other effects.
For comparison with the existing literature, our main set of results is derived under the
assumptions η = ε. For this case we provide analytical proofs.
We also show how results change when η 6= ε. In this case the general equilibrium and the
optimal policy problem do not have explicit analytical solutions. Thus, we have to rely on
numerical simulations.
6.1 Production Subsidies
In this section we consider the case of a production subsidy/tax. We assume that this is the
only available policy instrument, i.e. we set τI = τ
∗
I = τX = τ
∗
X = 1.
6.1.1 Benchmark case: η = ε
We start from a situation where none of the two countries is using the production subsidy (i.e.
τC = τ
∗
C = 1) and ask what the optimal choice of τC for Home would be under the assumption
that Foreign keeps τ ∗C = 1. We first present a numerical example to illustrate the different
economic mechanisms at work.21
Figure 1 shows the behavior of some key variables for both countries as functions of the
domestic production subsidy. An increase in the domestic subsidy increases demand for domes-
21For our numerical example we consider ε = 4 and transport costs τ = 1.4, which are standard values in
the literature. Anderson and Wincoop (2004) estimate an international trade cost excluding policy barriers
of around 60% for industrialized countries. This splits into a transport cost of 21% and a 32% international
trade costs excluding policy barriers, such as language and information costs (0.6=1.21*1.32-1). We view this as
rather high but our results are perfectly robust to choosing this number for trade costs. We set the expenditure
share on the differentiated sector α = 0.4, as in Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). We use this calibration
throughout the paper.
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tic differentiated goods and thus, other things equal, generates positive profits for producers
located in the domestic country. This causes firms in the differentiated sector to enter the
domestic market and to leave the Foreign one until zero profits are reached. Hence, the sub-
sidy to production causes agglomeration. Overall, the increase in N more than compensates
the decrease in N∗ and pushes the number of varieties available at the world level closer to
efficiency. This comes at the cost of worsening domestic terms of trade. Domestic utility as a
function of the subsidy is hump-shaped, reflecting this trade-off. Overall, the terms of trade
externality predominates and utility is maximized at a level of domestic subsidy that is strictly
smaller than the efficient one (τC =
ε−1
ε
= 0.75). Interestingly, even though now production is
more efficient at the world level, Foreign is worse off. This is due to the higher transportation
costs Foreign consumers have to pay after the relocation of firms to Home.
To abstract from the role played by the desire to correct the inefficiency caused by monopolistic
competition, we run a second experiment starting from the first best allocation, i.e. we set
τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
. This is done in Figure 2. A unilateral decrease in the domestic subsidy
from the efficient level increases domestic utility, even though it lowers domestic consumption
of differentiated goods. Hence, the optimal strategy given that the other country chooses an
efficient subsidy, is to deviate to a smaller subsidy. This causes exit of firms in Home and entry
in Foreign and improves domestic terms of trade, while lowering the aggregate level of efficiency.
Home is under-subsidizing and not over-subsidizing domestic production as the home market
effect would require. We can then conclude that in the case of production subsidies the terms
of trade externality dominates.22
22An alternative interpretation of the difference in outcomes depending on the (in)efficiency of the initial
allocation could be based on Grossman and Helpman (1991), pages 82-83. The authors shows (in a closed
economy setting where the equilibrium number of varieties is efficient) that the introduction of an an additional
variety to the economy has two effects: 1) a gain in consumer surplus and 2) a profit destruction effect (negative
income effect). When starting from an efficient number of varieties, these effects exactly cancel each other. If,
however, – as in our case – the number of varieties is inefficiently low, the gain in consumer surplus from more
variety outweighs the profit destruction effect. Thus, a policy maker would subsidize production of differentiated
goods in order to increase variety. This is also true in our setup when considering the perspective of a world
policy maker that maximizes average welfare of the world economy. In our setting things are more complicated
from the domestic policy maker’s perspective, since domestic income is determined in world general equilibrium.
Thus, domestic policy makers do not trade of the world’s marginal gain in consumer surplus against the world’s
marginal income effect. Instead, they take into account that in the presence of trade costs introducing an
additional domestic variety cuts disproportionately more into the profits of domestic firms than into the one of
Foreign firms, causing negative income effects at Home. We interpret this effect as a worsening in the welfare
relevant terms of trade. Alternatively, one could split the change in the welfare-relevant terms of trade into a
profit destruction effect and a change in the terms of trade of individual varieties (which worsen because of the
production subsidy). The conclusions remain the same.
18
Having gained some intuition, we now move to proving these statements formally.23 First, we
show that an increase in the domestic subsidy indeed increases the number of domestic firms
at the expense of Foreign.
Lemma 1 Let τ > 1, ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ
∗
C ≤ 1 then ∂N∂τC < 0, ∂N
∗
∂τC
> 0 and
|∂N∗
∂τC
| − | ∂N
∂τC
| < 0.
Lemma 1 implies that, starting from a symmetric equilibrium where either no country is
using the subsidy or both are subsidizing at the same rate, a unilateral increase in the domestic
subsidy τC
24 increases N at the cost of a reduction in N∗. At the same time the world level of
differentiated varieties, N +N∗, increases.
Next, we decompose the welfare effects of an increase in the domestic production subsidy
using (39) and the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 Let τ > 1, ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ
∗
C ≤ 1 then ∂P/pz∂τC > 0 and
∂I/pz
∂τC
> 0.
Increasing the production subsidy has two opposing effects on indirect utility. On the one
hand, it increases indirect utility by lowering the domestic price index. This welfare gain
reflects both the home market effect and the reduction in the monopolistic distortion. Both
increase indirect utility by improving the purchasing power for a given income level. On the
other hand, it decreases indirect utility by reducing domestic income. Intuition for the sources
of this welfare loss can be gained from (41). The term B1 > 0
25 implies that an increase in
the production subsidy causes the terms of trade to move against Home. Moreover, the cost of
reducing monopolistic distortions augments as indicated by the term B2 > 0 which captures the
domestic opportunity cost in terms of reduced production of homogeneous goods.26 Whether
the price or the income effect predominates crucially depends on the (in)efficiency of the initial
23All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
24Recall that higher subsidy means moving τC from 1 to 0.
25The proof of the signs of the B’s can be found in the appendix.
26There are also some other effects but all go in the same direction as the home market effect. The Foreign
substitution effect is positive ( B3 < 0), since Foreign demand shift towards Home differentiated varieties and
this more than compensates for the shift of Foreign demand towards homogeneous goods. In the case in which
Foreign sets a positive subsidy, there is a positive income effect in Foreign (B4 < 0). The increase in the
domestic subsidy increases Foreign income because it reduces the Foreign subsidy bill through its effect on firm
delocation. Finally, Home demand shifts away from Foreign varieties and away from homogeneous goods. This
also has a positive effect on domestic income ( B5 < 0).
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allocation. This is proved in the next Theorem:
Theorem 1 Let τ > 1, ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1. Then:
(1) ∂W
∂τC
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C=1
< 0
(2) ∂W
∂τC
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C=
ε−1
ε
> 0
(3) ∂W
∂τC
∣∣∣∣
τC=
ε−1
ε
,τ∗C=1
> 0 if τ < 4 or ε− 1 > α.
The first part of Theorem 1 states that starting from a free trade equilibrium countries always
have an incentive to set a small subsidy. Parts 2 and 3 state that this subsidy is always27
inefficiently low, independently of whether the other country also subsidizes production. We
therefore conclude that the terms of trade effect always outweighs the other effects in the choice
of the production subsidy. This is an important result because it contradicts the standard
wisdom that in the two-sector Krugman model countries have an incentive to oversubsidize
production in order to attract more firms (Venables (1987)).
The intuition for Theorem 1 is the following. At the free trade allocation the gains from
lowering the price index are high due to the inefficiently low number of varieties. In addition,
the opportunity cost from reducing the homogeneous good is negligible due to its abundance.
At the same time, the income effect is small because the volume of trade is low, thus the terms
of trade externality is weak. However, as we move towards the efficient allocation, the gain from
lowering the price index decreases while the opportunity cost increases, thus weakening both
the home market and the inefficiency considerations. Moreover, the terms of trade externality
is strengthen as the volume of trade increases.
6.1.2 Implications of η 6= ε
Next, we check if the previous results generalize to the case η < ε.28 The main advantage of this
more general specification is that we can shut off the home market effect29 (by setting τ = 1)
27Note that the third part of the theorem is always satisfied for ε ≥ 2, a standard value for the trade elasticity.
28η ≤ ε guarantees that demand for varieties is increasing in the sectoral price index.
29With η = ε and no transport costs domestic and foreign varieties are perfect substitutes, so that a positive
production subsidy set by one country induces the whole differentiated sector to locate in that country i.e. it
induces full specialization.
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or/and the monopolistic distortion (by letting ε → ∞). The drawback of this more general
model is that it cannot be solved analytically, so we have to rely on simulations.
In Figure 3 we report both the subsidy that implements the first best allocation (top) and the
optimal domestic subsidy/tax (bottom) for the case when τ ∗C is set to one. We consider τ ∈ [1, 2]
and ε ∈ [2, 8].30 Several things are worth noticing. First, the efficient production subsidy does
not depend on the level of transport cost and approaches one (no subsidy) as ε increases.
Second, the domestic country always chooses a production subsidy lower than the efficient one,
independently of the level of the monopolistic distortion and the level of the transport costs.
Third, without the home market effect (τ = 1) and with sufficiently low monopolistic distortions
(high ε) the terms of trade externality becomes strong enough to induce domestic policy makers
to tax production at a positive rate. Results are qualitatively the same when considering the
case τC =
ε−1
ε
.31
6.2 Tariffs
Here, we explore what drives single country policy makers’ incentives when the only instrument
available to them is an import tariff. Again, we analyze the impact of a unilateral change in
the domestic tariff in the absence of Foreign policy intervention (τ ∗I = 1).
6.2.1 Benchmark case: η = ε
First, we study the effects of a unilateral change in the domestic tariff when the number of
varieties is inefficiently low (i.e. τC = τ
∗
C = 1). In this scenario a positive tariff improves
domestic welfare. This result is consistent with Venables (1987) and Ossa (2008) and can be
explained as follows.
When unilaterally setting a tariff/subsidy on imports (see Figure 4), the domestic policy maker
faces a trade off between different effects. On the one hand, a tariff induces firms to relocate
to the domestic economy and allows domestic consumers to save on transport costs. On the
other hand, a tariff worsens domestic terms of trade and exacerbates the inefficiency due to
monopolistic competition by reducing N + N∗, the total number of the varieties produced in
30Given that η ≤ ε, for this exercise we set η = 2 in order to study also cases with very strong inefficiency
due to monopolistic distortion.
31The figure is not reported to save space but is available on request.
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the differentiated sector. Differently from the case of the production subsidy, here the home
market effect prevails: a tariff on imports increases domestic welfare by boosting consumption
in the differentiated and in the homogenous sectors. The impact of a unilateral change in the
domestic tariff on the terms of trade is weaker than in the case of the other policy instruments
because tariffs affect terms of trade only through their indirect impact on the relative number of
varieties ( N
N∗ ). At the same time, the potential efficiency gain of subsidizing imports is smaller
than the one of a production subsidy since tariffs do not allow to correct distortions in the
price of domestically produced goods. However, under the assumption that the monopolistic
distortion is removed by a production subsidy (Figure 5), the optimal unilateral policy is an
import subsidy. An import subsidy renders local differentiated goods relatively more expensive
and induces households to increase their demand for Foreign goods. As a consequence, firms
agglomerate in the Foreign economy and the number of domestic varieties is reduced while the
Foreign one is boosted. This increases the domestic price level but also improves domestic terms
of trade, which allows Home to import more differentiated goods for each unit of exports. In
other words, when the monopolistic distortion is removed by an appropriate production subsidy,
the terms of trade externality more than compensates the rise in transport cost generated by
an import subsidy.
We now turn to a more formal analysis. First, we show that an increase in the domestic tariff
always increases the number of domestic varieties at the expense of Foreign. In addition, setting
a higher tariff always reduces the total number of differentiated varieties. Lemma 3 summarizes
these results.
Lemma 3 Let τ > 1, ε > 1, 0 < α < 1 and τI = τ
∗
I = 1. Then, when τC = τ
∗
C = 1 or
τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
, ∂N
∂τI
> 0, ∂N
∗
∂τI
< 0 and | ∂N
∂τI
| − |∂N∗
∂τI
| < 0.
Again, we can decompose the welfare effects of an increase in the domestic tariff using (39).
We first consider the case in which the initial allocation is inefficient.
Lemma 4 Let τ > 1, ε > 1, 0 < α < 1, τI = 1 and τC = 1. Then
∂P/pz
∂τI
|τC=τ∗C ,τI=τ∗I < 0 and
∂I/pz
∂τI
|τC=τ∗C ,τI=τ∗I > 0.
When there are no policy interventions a positive tariff always increases welfare. The mecha-
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nism behind this is the home market effect, which increases the relative weight of cheap domestic
varieties in the domestic consumption basket. This outcome dominates the negative effect on
the world number of varieties that exacerbates the inefficiencies due to the monopolistic distor-
tions. Lemma 4 formally proves the impact of tariffs on the Home price index and on domestic
income. It confirms Venables (1987)’ and Ossa (2008)’s results and their claim that in their
analysis (where there is no correction of the monopolistic distortion) ignoring income effects by
considering tariffs to be a pure waste is not a restrictive assumption. In fact, in this special
case the income effect due to a tariff is always positive and reinforces the home market effect.32
However, results turn around when we consider an initial allocation that is efficient:
Lemma 5 Let τ > 1, ε > 1, 0 < α < 1, τI = 1 and τC =
(ε−1)
ε
. Then ∂P/pz
∂τI
|τC=τ∗C ,τI=τ∗I < 0 if
ε− 1 > α and ∂I/pz
∂τI
|τC=τ∗C ,τI=τ∗I < 0.
According to Lemma 5, as long as ε − 1 > α, a tariff renders domestic differentiated goods
cheaper even when the monopolistic inefficiency is completely offset by an appropriate produc-
tion subsidy. Conversely the income effect is negative in this case. This switch in the sign of the
derivative of income can be explained as follows. When starting from an efficient equilibrium,
the volume of trade is larger than when starting from an inefficient equilibrium because the
total number of varieties in the differentiated sector is higher. Therefore, the income loss due
to a terms of trade worsening is larger as well. Similarly, the opportunity cost in terms of
homogenous good of increasing the domestic production in the differentiated sector is higher
because homogeneous goods are no longer inefficiently abundant.
Theorem 2 formally proves that the optimal unilateral tariff is positive when starting from a
free trade allocation and negative (an import subsidy) when starting from the Pareto-optimal
allocation implemented by a production subsidy.
Theorem 2 Let τ > 1, ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ
∗
C = 1, then
∂W
∂τI
|τI=τ∗I=1 > 0. However,
if τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
then ∂W
∂τI
|τI=τ∗I=1 < 0.
32If we look at the decomposition of (41), it becomes clear that the income effect is positive because the
terms of trade effect is dominated by other effects. A positive tariff implies a shift in Foreign demand towards
domestic varieties (B3 > 0). Similarly, domestic demand shifts away from Foreign varieties ( B5 > 0). Both
effects increase domestic income. In contrast, the terms of trade externality and the opportunity cost decrease
income (B1 < 0, B2 < 0). Finally, the Foreign income effect, B4, is zero, since there is no Foreign policy
intervention.
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On the one hand, the first part of Theorem 2 confirms Venables (1987)’s and Ossa (2008)’s
result that the optimal unilateral trade policy is a positive tariff, even when we allow for
redistribution of tariff revenues. On the other hand, the second part of Theorem 2 makes clear
that this result depends crucially on whether the initial allocation is efficient. When starting
from the Pareto optimal allocation, the optimal unilateral policy turns out to be an import
subsidy. Like in the case of the production subsidy, at the efficient allocation the high volume
of trade strengthen the terms of trade externality. Simultaneously, the relative low price level
implies a weak home market effect and a high opportunity cost of reducing the production of
the homogeneous good.
6.2.2 Implications of η 6= ε
Here we check if these results are robust to allowing ε to be different from η.
Again, let us first treat a situation where the production subsidies τC and τ
∗
C are set equal
to one. Figure 6 plots the optimal tariff/subsidy on imports as functions of the elasticity of
substitution among varieties ε ∈ (2, 8) and the iceberg cost τ ∈ [1, 2] with η being equal to 2.
Consider first the case τ = 1. This implies that the home market effect is absent and the
only incentives for policy makers are terms of trade effects and the elimination of monopolistic
distortions. Consequently, the optimal policy is an import subsidy (i.e. τI < 1). As ε becomes
larger and larger, policy makers are less willing to subsidize imports (i.e. the optimal import
subsidy tends to one). When ε increases, the differentiated sector converges to a competitive
sector which produces a single variety and the elasticity of N with respect to tariffs becomes
zero. As a consequence, both motives (the correction of the monopolistic distortion and the
incentive to improve the terms of trade) for subsidizing imports vanish.
Moving next to positive but sufficiently low levels of transport costs, single country policy
makers still find it optimal to subsidize imports while for high transport costs the optimal
policy is a tariff. The intuition is straightforward: while terms of trade effects and monopolistic
distortions determine policy choices for low transport costs, the home market effect prevails for
high transport costs. Note, however, that if ε is sufficiently bigger than η, the optimal policy
is an import subsidy even for transport costs of around 40%.
We can then conclude that the results of Venables (1987) and Ossa (2008) are not robust to
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the plausible case in which the elasticity of substitution between varieties is greater than the
trade elasticity, even when we start from an inefficient allocation.33
6.3 Export Taxes
Finally, we briefly discuss the case of export taxes under the assumption that τI = τ
∗
I = τ
∗
X = 1.
6.3.1 Benchmark case: η = ε
Once more, in the first scenario we study unilateral deviations from free trade under the as-
sumption that the monopolistic distortion has not been eliminated. Figure 7 shows how a
deviation to a positive subsidy on exports that attracts more firms to the domestic economy
and increases the overall number of varieties available at the word level improves domestic
welfare. The intuition is the same as in the production subsidy case.34
The second scenario (Figure 8) considers the case where the monopolistic distortion has been
eliminated by production subsidies (τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
). Now a unilateral deviation to a positive
tax on exports, that relocates firms to the Foreign economy and induces an overall reduction
in the number of differentiated varieties, is welfare improving since it improves domestic terms
of trade. Again, at the efficient allocation, the high trade volume leads to a strong terms of
trade externality. At the same time, the price level is low and the opportunity cost of reducing
production of the homogeneous god is sizable, thus implying a weak home market externality.
6.3.2 Implications of η 6= ε
In Figure 9 we report the optimal domestic export tax/subsidy for the case τC = τ
∗
C = 1 and
τ ∗X = 1 for different values of ε and τ . While the home market effect and the monopolistic
distortion call for a subsidy, in the benchmark case the terms of trade externality would require
a tax and the first two effects predominate. Figure 9 shows that this result does not go through
in a more general setup where we allow for the intra-industry elasticity ε to exceed the trade
33Our finding that a positive import subsidy is optimal if the monopolistic inefficiency is corrected remains
valid independently of the values of τ and ε. The figure is omitted to save space but is available from the
authors on request.
34Gains from reducing the price level are high and opportunity costs of reducing Z are low because the number
of differentiated varieties is too low. At the same time, the terms of trade externality is weak due to the low
trade volume.
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elasticity η. On the one hand, one might consider this result as not so surprising given that,
by increasing ε, we are reducing the monopolistic distortion and also, as explained earlier, the
home market externality. On the other hand, ε needs to be only marginally bigger than η
for the optimal strategy to be an export tax, thus underlining the weakness of the previous
result. When considering the case τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
, it is always optimal to set an export tax,
independently on the level of τ and ε, thus the terms of trade and revenue externalities always
predominate in this context.35
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied unilateral trade policy in a two-sector variant of the Krugman
(1980) model of intra-industry trade. We have isolated the different incentives that drive policy
makers’ choices. These are determined by three main effects: a terms of trade effect, a home
market externality and a distortion in the aggregate allocation due to monopolistic pricing. In
addition, our analysis has revealed what the welfare relevant terms of trade in this model are.
Contrary to the point of view of the previous literature, which has considered the prices of
individual varieties in international markets as the terms of trade, we have shown that policy
makers care about aggregate relative price indices of importables and not only about the prices
of varieties. This implies that terms of trade effects and the home market externality coexist
even when considering tariffs and a homogeneous good produced with constant returns that
fixes relative factor prices.
Our main contribution has been to show that all previous results on trade policy in the
two-sector Krugman model depend crucially on the inefficiency of the free trade allocation.
Indeed, monopolistic distortion implies an inefficiently high price level and a low volume of
trade, thus strengthening the incentive to agglomerate firms and weakening terms of trade
externalities. This leads to the optimality of import tariffs/export subsidies and production
subsidies. Differently, at the efficient allocation, gains from further reduction in the price level
are small while opportunity costs of reducing the production of the homogeneous good are high
(weak home market effect). At the same time, the terms of trade externality becomes strong
due to the high volume of trade. Thus, domestic policy makers optimally choose to set import
35To save space we do not include this figure. The relevant figure is available on request.
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subsidies/export taxes and inefficiently low production subsidies.
The analysis in this paper sets the foundations for studying strategic trade policy in this set-
up. Now that policy makers’ incentives have been clarified, Nash equilibrium policy outcomes,
where many of the incentives that determine policies are obscured by strategic interaction, can
be investigated. This is done in Campolmi et al. (2010).
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APPENDIX
A Equilibrium allocation and prices for the case η = ε
Under the parametric restrictions η = ε, it is possible to recover the equilibrium allocations
and prices (and then implicitly single country welfare) as a function of the parameters of the
model and of the policy instruments. Since we are studying production subsidies and tariffs,
we set τX = τ
∗
X = 1.
Under those assumptions relative prices in (37) simplify to:
P
pz
=
ε
ε− 1
[
Nτ 1−εC +N
∗ (τIττ ∗C)
1−ε] 11−ε P ∗
pz
=
ε
ε− 1
[
N∗(τ ∗C)
1−ε +N (τ ∗I ττC)
1−ε] 11−ε (42)
Combining the zero profit conditions (25) and (26) and substituting out the expressions for
the relative prices (36), it is possible to derive the following expression for C and C∗:
C =
f(ε− 1) ( ε
ε−1
)ε
( P
pz
)−ε(ττI)ε ((ττ ∗I τC)
ε − τ(τ ∗C)ε)
(τIτ ∗I )ετ 2ε − τ 2
(43)
C∗ =
f(ε− 1) ( ε
ε−1
)ε
(P
∗
pz
)−ε(τ ∗I τ)
ε ((ττIτ
∗
C)
ε − ττ εC)
(τIτ ∗I )ετ 2ε − τ 2
(44)
Using the trade balance condition (35), the labor market clearing condition (31), the equivalent
equations for the foreign country, and the expressions for C, C∗, P
pz
and P
∗
pz
just derived, we
have the following system of equations in N and N∗:
−L+ A1N + A2N∗ = 0 (45)
−L+ A∗2N + A∗1N∗ = 0 (46)
the solution of which is:
N =
L(A2 − A∗1)
A∗2A2 − A1A∗1
N∗ =
L(A∗2 − A1)
A∗2A2 − A1A∗1
(47)
where:
A1 =
f(1− α)ε(ττI)ετ 1−εC ((ττ ∗I τC)ε − τ(τ ∗C)ε)
α (τ 2ε(τIτ ∗I )ε − τ 2)
− fεττ
1−ε
C ((ττIτ
∗
C)
ε − ττ εC)
τ 2ε(τIτ ∗I )ε − τ 2
+ fε (48)
A∗2 =
f(1− α)εττ 1−εC ((ττIτ ∗C)ε − ττ εC)
α (τ 2ε(τIτ ∗I )ε − τ 2)
+
fεττ 1−εC ((ττIτ
∗
C)
ε − ττ εc )
τ 2ε(τIτ ∗I )ε − τ 2
(49)
A2 =
f(1− α)εττI(τ ∗C)1−ε ((ττ ∗I τC)ε − τ(τ ∗C)ε)
α (τ 2ε(τIτ ∗I )ε − τ 2)
+
fετ(τ ∗C)
1−ε ((ττCτ ∗I )
ε − τ(τ ∗C)ε)
τ 2ε(τIτ ∗I )ε − τ 2
(50)
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A∗1 =
f(1− α)ε(ττ ∗I )ε(τ ∗C)1−ε ((ττIτ ∗C)ε − ττ εC)
α (τ 2ε(τIτ ∗I )ε − τ 2)
− fετ(τ
∗
C)
1−ε ((ττ ∗I τC)
ε − τ(τ ∗C)ε)
τ 2ε(τIτ ∗I )ε − τ 2
+ fε (51)
Finally substituting equation (9) into the budget constraint, it is possible to write consumption
as a function of income:
C = α
I
pz
(
P
pz
)−1
(52)
where I = WL + T . Substituting (9) and (52) into the utility function, taking logs and
disregarding the constant, gives the (log) indirect utility:
W = −α log
(
P
pz
)
+ log
(
I
pz
)
(53)
An increase in the production subsidy on a one hand increases W due to the reduction in the
price level, but on the other hand it also reduces it due to the negative effect on income.
B Production Subsidy τc
We can now proceed to prove the lemmas and theorem relative to the production subsidy.
First, we compute the derivatives of N and N∗ w.r.t. τC and evaluate their sign starting from
a symmetric situation τC = τ
∗
C .
Lemma 1 Let τ > 1, ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ
∗
C ≤ 1 then ∂N∂τC < 0, ∂N
∗
∂τC
> 0 and
|∂N∗
∂τC
|τC=τ∗C − | ∂N∂τC |.
Proof.1 ∂N
∂τC
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C
=
Lα [τ 2 (α2 + (1− α2) τC) + τ ε+1 (2(1− α)(ε− 1)τC + α(2ε− 1)) + (1− α)τ 2ε ((1− α)τC + α)]
fε (τ ε − τ) [α− (α− 1)τC ]2 [α(τ + τ ε)(τC − 1)− τC(τ ε − τ)]
(54)
∂N∗
∂τC
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C
=
Lατ [α(τ ε − τ) + τ ε (2(α− 1)ετC − 2αε)]
fε (τ ε − τ) [α− (α− 1)τC ]2 [α(τ + τ ε)(τC − 1)− τC(τ ε − τ)]
(55)
The denominator of both expressions is negative whenever τC ≤ 1. The numerator of the
first expression is always positive being the sum of only positive terms. For the numerator of
the second expression to be positive we would need τC < α
1−τ1−ε−2ε
2(1−α)ε , not possible given that
τC >= 0 by definition. Finally, |∂N∗∂τC | − | ∂N∂τC | = ∂N
∗
∂τC
+ ∂N
∂τC
= − L(1−α)α
fε[α−(α−1)τC ]2 < 0
Next, we prove the effects of a change in the production subsidy on relative price of the
differentiated goods and on domestic income.
Lemma 2 Let τ > 1, ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ
∗
C ≤ 1 then
∂ P
pz
∂τC
> 0 and
∂ I
pz
∂τC
> 0.
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Proof.1
∂
(
P
pz
)
/∂τC
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C
=
1
ε− 1
(
ε
ε− 1
)(1−ε)(
P
pz
)ε [
τ−εC (ε− 1)N − τ 1−εC
(
∂N
∂τC
+
1
τ ε−1
∂N∗
∂τC
)]
(56)
For the derivative of the price index it suffices to notice that
∂N
∂τC
+ 1
τε−1
∂N∗
∂τC
= Lατ−ε
[
ατ2+(1−α)τ2ε(α+(1−α)τC)+τ1+ε(α(2ε−α)+(1−α)(2ε−1−α)τC
fε(τε−τ)[α−(α−1)τC ]2[α(τ+τε)(τC−1)−τC(τε−τ)]
]
< 0 being the nu-
merator a sum of positive terms while for the denominator we already proved it to be negative.
For the derivative of income it is enough to remember that I
pz
= L + Nεf(τC − 1) and that
∂N
∂τC
< 0.
Before proving the theorem on the welfare consequences of a change in the production subsidy,
it is useful to decompose
∂ I
pz
∂τC
into the different effects as in (41).
Lemma A.1 Let τ > 1, ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ
∗
C ≤ 1 then B1 > 0, B2 > 0, B4 < 0
and B5 < 0. If τC = τ
∗
C = 1 or τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
then also B3 < 0.
Proof.1
• B1 > 0: When τC = τ ∗C the equilibrium is symmetric thus there is no trade in the homoge-
neous good and B1 = −α
(
PF
P
)−ε (pz
P
)
I
pz
∂
„
P∗H
PH
«
∂τC
. Note that
∂
„
P∗H
PH
«
∂τC
=
∂P∗H/pz
∂τC
PH− ∂PH/pz∂τC P
∗
H
P 2H
<
0 given that ∂
(
P ∗H
pz
)
/∂τC =
ε
ε−1N
∗( 11−ε)
(
− τ∗C
(ε−1)N∗
∂N∗
∂τC
)
< 0 and ∂
(
PH
pz
)
/∂τC =
ε
ε−1N
( 11−ε)
(
1− τC
(ε−1)N
∂N
∂τC
)
> 0.
• B2 > 0: This is so given that B2 =
[
−εf
(
pz
τPH
)
∂N
∂τC
]
and ∂N
∂τC
< 0.
• B3 < 0: This is so given that B3 = α
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−ε
I∗
pz
(
pz
P ∗
)2 [−εP ∗/pz
P ∗F /pz
∂P ∗F /pz
∂τC
+ (ε− 1)∂P ∗/pz
∂τC
]
,
∂P ∗F /pz
∂τC
= τ ε
ε−1N
( 11−ε)
(
1− τC
(ε−1)N
∂N
∂τC
)
> 0, ∂P
∗/pz
∂τC
|τC=τ∗C=1 = −P
∗
pz
ετ
(ε−1)(τε−τ) < 0 and
∂P ∗/pz
∂τC
|τC=τ∗C= ε−1ε = −
P ∗
pz
ε2τ
(α+ε−1)((α+ε−1)τε+(α−ε+1)τ) < 0.
• B4 < 0: This is so given that B4 =
[
α
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−ε (
pz
P ∗
) ∂( I∗pz )
∂τi
]
, I
∗
pz
= L + (τ ∗C − 1)εfN∗ and
∂I/pz
∂τC
= εf ∂N
∗
∂τC
< 0
• B5 < 0: Note thatB5 = αP
∗
H
PH
(
PF
P
)−ε I
pz
pz
P
[
ε P/pz
PF /pz
(
pz
P
)2 (∂PF /pz
∂τC
P
pz
− ∂P/pz
∂τC
PF
pz
)
+ ∂P/pz
∂τC
pz
P
]
=
α
P ∗H
PH
(
PF
P
)−ε I
pz
pz
P
[
ε
(
PF
pz
)−1
∂PF /pz
∂τC
− (ε− 1)∂P/pz
∂τC
pz
P
]
< 0
given that ∂
(
PF
pz
)
/∂τC = τ
ε
ε−1N
∗( 11−ε)
(
− τ∗C
(ε−1)N∗
∂N∗
∂τC
)
< 0 and ∂P/pz
∂τC
> 0.
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Before proving the effect on domestic welfare of a change in the domestic production subsidy
(Theorem 1), we derive the necessary and sufficient condition for N > 0 and N∗ > 0 i.e. no
specialization in the case in which τC =
ε−1
ε
and τ ∗C = 1. This will then be used in the proof of
Theorem 1.
Lemma A.2 Let τ > 1, ε > 1, 0 < α < 1, τC =
ε−1
ε
and τ ∗C = 1. Then, N > 0 and N
∗ > 0 if
an only if
(
1 + α
ε−1
)
τ ε−1 +
(
1− α
ε−1
)
τ 1−ε > 2
(
ε
ε−1
)ε
.
Proof.1 When τC =
ε−1
ε
and τ ∗C = 1, the equilibrium number of varieties is given by:
N =
Lα ε
ε
ε−1 τ
ε(2( ε−1ε )
ε−(τε−1+τ1−ε))
f((ε−1)ετ−εετε)((1+ αε−1 )τε−1−( εε−1)
ε
)
N∗ =
Lαεε−1τε(2( εε−1)
ε−((1+ αε−1 )τε−1+(1− αε−1 )τ1−ε))
f(εετε−(ε−1)ετ)(( εε−1)
ε−(1+ α
ε−1 )τ
ε−1)
Note that 2
(
ε−1
ε
)ε − τ ε−1 + τ 1−ε < 0 given that τ ε−1 + τ 1−ε > 1 and ( ε−1
ε
)ε ≤ 1
e
. The last
inequalities follows from limε→∞
(
ε−1
ε
)ε
= 1
e
and
∂( ε−1ε )
ε
∂ε
=
(
ε−1
ε
)ε (
log
(
ε−1
ε
)
+ 1
ε−1
)
> 0 for all
ε. Also, note that (ε−1)ετ−εετ ε < 0. Therefore, N > 0 if and only if (1+ α
ε−1)τ
ε−1−( ε
ε−1
)ε
> 0.
Moving to N∗, we have that the denominator is always negative when N > 0. Therefore, N∗
is positive when N > 0 if and only if 2
(
ε
ε−1
)ε − ((1 + α
ε−1)τ
ε−1 + (1− α
ε−1)τ
1−ε) < 0.
Finally, note that the condition on N∗ implies the one on N . Indeed,
(1 + α
ε−1)τ
ε−1 + (1− α
ε−1)τ
1−ε > 2
(
ε
ε−1
)ε
=⇒ (1 + α
ε−1)τ
ε−1 >
(
ε
ε−1
)ε
Why this is true it can be proven by contradiction. If (1+ α
ε−1)τ
ε−1 <
(
ε
ε−1
)ε
then (1− α
ε−1)τ
1−ε <(
ε
ε−1
)ε
. But hence (1 + α
ε−1)τ
ε−1 + (1 − α
ε−1)τ
1−ε < 2
(
ε
ε−1
)ε
which contradicts our initial
assumption.
Theorem 1 Let τ > 1, ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1. Then:
(1) ∂W
∂τC
|τC=τ∗C=1 < 0
(2) ∂W
∂τC
|τC=τ∗C= ε−1ε > 0
(3) ∂W
∂τC
|τC= ε−1ε ,τ∗C=1 > 0 if τ < 4 or ε− 1 > α.
Proof.1
(1) ∂W
∂τC
|τC=τ∗C=1 = α((α−1)τ
ε−τ(α+ε−1))
(ε−1)(τε−τ) < 0
(2) ∂W
∂τC
|τC=τ∗C= ε−1ε =
αε2τ(τε+τ)
(ε−1)(τε−τ)(α(τ+τε)+(ε−1)(τε−τ)) > 0
(3) We prove it in two steps. First, we show that a sufficient condition for ∂W
∂τC
|τC= ε−1ε ,τ∗C=1 > 0
is τ >
(
ε
ε−1
) ε
ε−1 . Second, we show that under the assumption of no specialization (N > 0
and N∗ > 0), τ >
(
ε
ε−1
) ε
ε−1 if τ < 4 or ε− 1 > α.
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3a ∂W
∂τC
|τC= ε−1ε ,τ∗C=1 =
− α(ε−1)−2εετε−2
(τε−1−( εε−1)
ε
)(( εε−1)
ε−( α
ε−1+1)τ
ε−1)
+ αε
−ε(ε−1)ε−2(α+ε−1)
(εετε−(ε−1)ετ)(τε−1−( ε−1ε )
ε
(1− α(ε−1)))(ε−1)εε
Note that a sufficient condition for the first term to be positive is τ >
(
ε
ε−1
) ε
ε−1 .
Indeed, this implies that τ ε−1 − ( ε
ε−1
)ε
> 0 and
(
ε
ε−1
)ε − ( α
ε−1 + 1)τ
ε−1 < 0.
Next, since εετ ε − (ε − 1)ετ > 0 then the second term is positive if and only if
τ ε−1 − ( ε−1
ε
)ε (
1− α
(ε−1)
)
> 0. However this last condition is always verified when
τ >
(
ε
ε−1
) ε
ε−1 given that
(
ε
ε−1
)ε
>
(
ε−1
ε
)ε
>
(
ε−1
ε
)ε (
1− α
(ε−1)
)
.
3b Finally, we prove by contradiction that when N > 0 and N∗ > 0, if τ < 4 or ε−1 > α
then τ >
(
ε
ε−1
) ε
ε−1 . Suppose that τ ε−1 ≤ ( ε
ε−1
)ε
, then for N > 0 and N∗ > 0 by
Lemma 4 the following must hold:(
1 +
α
ε− 1
)(
ε
ε− 1
)ε
+
(
1− α
ε− 1
)
τ1−ε >
(
1 +
α
ε− 1
)
τ ε−1+
(
1− α
ε− 1
)
τ1−ε > 2
(
ε
ε− 1
)ε
⇔ (1− α
ε−1
)
τ 1−ε >
(
ε
ε−1
)ε (
1− α
ε−1
)
.
It follows that if 1 > α
ε−1 then τ
1−ε >
(
ε
ε−1
)ε
. This however contradicts τ ε−1 ≤(
ε
ε−1
)ε
. Thus, if N > 0 and N∗ > 0 then τ ε−1 ≤ ( ε
ε−1
)ε
only if ε − 1 ≤ α. This
proves that ε − 1 > α is a sufficient condition for the welfare to be decreasing in
the production subsidy. It only remains to show that another sufficient condition is
τ < 4. If 1 ≤ α
ε−1 by Lemma A.2:(
1 +
α
ε− 1
)
τ ε−1 >
(
1 +
α
ε− 1
)
τ ε−1 +
(
1− α
ε− 1
)
τ 1−ε > 2
(
ε
ε− 1
)ε
which implies:
τ > 2
1
ε−1
(
ε
ε− 1
) ε
ε−1
(
1 +
α
ε− 1
) 1
1−ε
>= 4
To see why this last condition is true let’s recall that
∂2
1
ε−1 ( εε−1)
ε
ε−1 (1+ αε−1)
1
1−ε
∂α
=
−2 1ε−1 ( α
ε−1 + 1
) ε
1−ε (ε − 1) 11−ε−3ε εε−1 < 0 and that ∂2
1
ε−1 ( εε−1)
ε
ε−1 (1+ αε−1)
1
1−ε
∂ε
|α=1 =
−2 1ε−1 ( α
ε−1 + 1
) ε
1−ε (ε− 1) 11−ε−3ε εε−1 < 0. Moreover if ε− 1 ≤ α, ε < 2. It follows if
ε− 1 ≤ α, τ > 2 1ε−1 ( ε
ε−1
) ε
ε−1
(
1 + α
ε−1
) 1
1−ε > 2
1
ε−1
(
ε
ε−1
) ε
ε−1
(
1 + α
ε−1
) 1
1−ε |α=1,ε=2= 4.
Therefore τ ε−1 ≤ ( ε
ε−1
)ε
only if ε− 1 ≤ α and τ > 4.
C Import Tariff τI
In this section while retaining the assumptions η = ε and τX = τ
∗
X , we allow for the use of an
import tariff as main policy instrument.
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Lemma 3 Let τ > 1, ε > 1, 0 < α < 1 and τI = τ
∗
I = 1. Then, when τC = τ
∗
C = 1 or
τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
, ∂N
∂τI
> 0, ∂N
∗
∂τI
< 0 and | ∂N
∂τI
| − |∂N∗
∂τI
| < 0.
Proof.1 First we compute the derivatives for the case τC = τ
∗
C = 1:
∂N
∂τI
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C=1
=
Lατ ε+1 [(1 + ε− α)τ + (α + ε− 1)τ ε]
fε(τ − τ ε)2(τ + τ ε) > 0 (57)
∂N∗
∂τI
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C=1
= −Lατ [(1− α)τ
2 + ετ 2ε + (α + ε− 1)τ ε+1]
fε(τ − τ ε)2 < 0 (58)∣∣∣∣∂N∂τI
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C=1
−
∣∣∣∣∂N∗∂τI
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C=1
= −L(1− α)ατ
fε(τ + τ ε)
< 0 (59)
Next, we compute the derivatives for the case τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
:
∂N
∂τI
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C=
ε−1
ε
=
Lατ(ε− 1) [(1− α)ατ 2 + (α + ε− 1)2τ 2ε + (ε2 + α− 1)τ 1+ε]
f(α + ε− 1)2 [α(τ + τ ε) + (ε− 1)(τ ε − τ)] (τ 2ε − τ 2) > 0 (60)
∂N∗
∂τI
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C=
ε−1
ε
=
Lατ(ε− 1) [(ε− 1)(1− α)τ 2 + ε(α + ε− 1)τ 2ε + ((ε− 1)2 + α(2ε− 1))τ ε+1]
f(α + ε− 1)2 [α(τ + τ ε) + (ε− 1)(τ ε − τ)] (τ 2 − τ 2ε) < 0
(61)∣∣∣∣∂N∂τI
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C=
ε−1
ε
−
∣∣∣∣∂N∗∂τI
∣∣∣∣
τC=τ
∗
C=
ε−1
ε
= − L(1− α)ατ(ε− 1)
f(α + ε− 1)2(τ + τ ε) < 0 (62)
Lemma 4 Let τ > 1, ε > 1, 0 < α < 1, τI = 1 and τC = 1. Then
∂P/pz
∂τI
|τC=τ∗C ,τI=τ∗I < 0 and
∂I/pz
∂τI
|τC=τ∗C ,τI=τ∗I > 0.
Proof.1
∂
(
P
pz
)
/∂τI |τC=τ∗C=τI=τ∗I=1 = Ppz
τ(ετ+α(τε−τ))
(ε−1)(τ2−τ2ε) > 0
∂
(
I
pz
)
/∂τI |τI=τ∗I=1,τC=τ∗C=1 = Lαττε+τ > 0
Lemma 5 Let τ > 1, ε > 1, 0 < α < 1,τI = 1 and τC =
(ε−1)
ε
. Then ∂P/pz
∂τI
|τC=τ∗C ,τI=τ∗I < 0 if
ε− 1 > α and ∂I/pz
∂τI
|τC=τ∗C ,τI=τ∗I < 0.
Proof.1
∂
(
P
pz
)
/∂τI |τC=τ∗C= ε−1ε ,τI=τ∗I=1 = −
P
pz
(α(1−α)+(ε−1−α)ε)τ2
((α+ε−1)(τε+τ)((α+ε−1)τε+(α−ε+1)τ) < 0 if ε− 1 > α
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∂
(
I
pz
)
/∂τI |τC=τ∗C= ε−1ε ,τI=τ∗I=1 = −
Lα(ε−1)τ2(((ε−1)2+2ε(ε−1)+α(2ε−1))τε−((ε−1)2−α)τ)
(α+ε−1)2(τε−τ)(τε+τ)((α+ε−1)τε+(α−ε+1)τ) < 0
Lemma A.3 Let τ > 1, ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1. If τC = τ
∗
C = 1 or τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
then B1 < 0,
B2 < 0, B3 > 0 and B5 > 0. If τC = τ
∗
C = 1 then B4 = 0 while if τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
then B4 > 0.
Proof.1
• B1 < 0: Since we start from a symmetric equilibrium, B1 = −α
(
PF
P
)−ε (pz
P
)
I
pz
∂
„
P∗H
PH
«
∂τI
.
Note that
∂
„
P∗H
PH
«
∂τI
=
∂P∗H/pz
∂τI
PH− ∂PH/pz∂τI P
∗
H
P 2H
> 0 given that ∂
(
P ∗H
pz
)
/∂τI =
ε
ε−1N
∗( 11−ε)
(
− τ∗C
(ε−1)N∗
∂N∗
∂τI
)
>
0 and ∂
(
PH
pz
)
/∂τI =
ε
ε−1N
( 11−ε)
(
− τC
(ε−1)N
∂N
∂τI
)
< 0.
• B2 < 0: This is so given that B2 =
[
−εf
(
pz
τPH
)
∂N
∂τI
]
and ∂N
∂τI
> 0.
• B3 > 0: This is so given that B3 = α
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−ε
I∗
pz
(
pz
P ∗
)2 [−εP ∗/pz
P ∗F /pz
∂P ∗F /pz
∂τI
+ (ε− 1)∂P ∗/pz
∂τI
]
,
∂
(
P ∗F
pz
)
/∂τI = ττC
ε
ε−1N
( 11−ε)
(
− τ∗I
(ε−1)N
∂N
∂τI
)
< 0 and
∂
(
P ∗
pz
)
/∂τI =
1
ε−1
(
ε
ε−1
)(1−ε) ( P
pz
)ε
τ 1−εC
[
−
(
∂N∗
∂τI
+ (τIτ)
1−ε ∂N
∂τI
)]
> 0.
• B4 ≥ 0: This is so given that B4 =
[
α
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−ε (
pz
P ∗
) ∂( I∗pz )
∂τI
]
, I
∗
pz
= L + (τ ∗C − 1)εfN∗ and
∂I/pz
∂τI
= (τ ∗C − 1)εf ∂N
∗
∂τI
≥ 0.
• B5 > 0: Note thatB5 = αP
∗
H
PH
(
PF
P
)−ε I
pz
pz
P
[
ε P/pz
PF /pz
(
pz
P
)2 (∂PF /pz
∂τI
P
pz
− ∂P/pz
∂τI
PF
pz
)
+ ∂P/pz
∂τI
pz
P
]
=
α
P ∗H
PH
(
PF
P
)−ε I
pz
pz
P
[
ε
(
PF
pz
)−1
∂PF /pz
∂τI
− (ε− 1)∂P/pz
∂τI
pz
P
]
> 0
given that ∂
(
PF
pz
)
/∂τI = ττ
∗
C
ε
ε−1N
∗( 11−ε)
(
1− τI
(ε−1)N∗
∂N∗
∂τI
)
and
∂
(
P
pz
)
/∂τI =
1
ε−1
(
ε
ε−1
)(1−ε) ( P
pz
)ε
τ 1−εC
[
(ε− 1)τ 1−ετ−εI N −
(
∂N
∂τI
+ (τIτ)
1−ε ∂N∗
∂τI
)]
< 0.
Theorem 2 Let τ > 1, ε > 1 and 0 < α < 1 and τI = τ
∗
I = 1. If τC = τ
∗
C = 1, then
∂W
∂τI
> 0.
However, if τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
, then ∂W
∂τI
< 0.
Proof.1 In the first case ∂W
∂τI
|τI=τ∗I=1,τC=τ∗C=1 = ατ((α+ε−1)τ
ε+(1−α)τ)
(ε−1)(τ2ε−τ2) > 0. In the second case
∂W
∂τI
|τI=τ∗I=1,τC=τ∗C= ε−1ε = −
ατ2((α+2ε−1)τε+(1−α)τ)
((α(τε+τ)+(ε−1)(τε−τ))(τ2ε−τ2) < 0.
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Figure 1: Effects of an unilateral shift of the domestic production subsidy when τ ∗C = 1.
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Figure 2: Effects of an unilateral shift of the domestic production subsidy when τ ∗C =
ε−1
ε
.
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Figure 3: First Best allocation (bottom) and domestic (top) production subsidy when τ ∗C = 1.
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Figure 4: Effects of an unilateral shift of the domestic tariff when τC = τ
∗
C = 1.
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Figure 5: Effects of an unilateral shift of the domestic tariff when τC = τ
∗
C = (ε− 1)/ε.
Figure 6: Domestic tariff/ subsidy on imports when τC = τ
∗
C = τ
∗
I = 1.
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Figure 7: Effects of an unilateral shift of the domestic export tax when τC = τ
∗
C = τ
∗
X = 1.
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Figure 8: Effects of an unilateral shift of domestic export tax when τC = τ
∗
C =
ε−1
ε
and τ ∗X = 1.
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Figure 9: Optimal Export tax/subsidy when τC = τ
∗
C = 1 and τ
∗
X = 1.
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